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Editorial Questions and answers
October 26th, 2005 -- The preliminary report issued by Detlev Mehlis’ commission of investigation into the death of Lebanon’s erstwhile prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, and 22 other people in Beirut on 14 February posits more questions than answers, on both the events surrounding the killing itself and the wider repercussions of the affair. The German magistrate is careful to point out in his report that the commission’s findings are far from complete, that, indeed, a good deal more detail is required before the full story of what took place can be told. “The presumption of innocence stands,” says the report, in reference to those parties it names as connected to the killing. There should be no surprise that the report lays the blame for the bomb blast firmly at the door of the Lebanese security services and their Syrian masters. Four senior Lebanese officials were already in custody and it is hard to believe that an act of such significance could have been carried out in the Lebanese capital without the support of at least certain quarters of the Syrian regime. Much of the detail is fascinating, telling of contacts between Lebanese and Syrian officials with one another and with a number of shady characters in Beirut and Damascus. But much of the evidence is decidedly circumstantial, both on the details of the operation itself and on the political events surrounding it. Telephone records link the accused Lebanese officials to individuals such as Shaykh Ahmad Abd al-Al, a Lebanese Sunni cleric, who phoned President Lahoud a few minutes before the explosion. One Ahmad Abu Adas was, according to witnesses, forced by the head of Syrian Military Intelligence, Asef Shawkat, to publicly claim responsibility for the killing on behalf of an unknown Islamist group. Abu Adas has since disappeared, taken to Damascus, it is claimed and subsequently killed. Zuhayr Saddiq, described by some as a Syrian army deserter, claimed he was an intelligence agent and told the commission that Hariri’s killing was planned in his Beirut flat by Lebanese and Syrian officials. The commission also made much of the political contacts which took place at the time when the extension of Lahoud’s term of office became a bone of contention between Damascus and some senior Lebanese politicians. A number of Lebanese leaders told the commission that President Asad threatened Hariri and others directly during meetings in Damascus. The Syrian government says that nothing of the sort took place. While such claims paint a markedly undignified picture of the workings of Syrian politics and diplomacy which is all too believable, the truth of the matter, at least in Hariri’s case, is of course unknowable, since there were no witnesses to his meeting with Asad at the time. Adding further to the dark atmosphere of intrigue the report uncovers is a curious passage where it states its belief that Hariri was murdered for political reasons but concedes that other factors could have been involved. It mentions fraud, money-laundering and corruption as possible motives for the “sophisticated group” that conspired to kill him. The most serious accusation, in regard to longer-term consequences, that Mehlis makes is that Damascus did not cooperate fully with the investigating commission. Foreign Minister Faruq Shara is effectively accused of lying to the investigators about Asad’s meeting with Hariri. For this charge alone, the regime can only expect trouble ahead unless it shows quickly that it is prepared to comply with whatever measures the Security Council imposes on it in response to the commission’s findings. The most immediate demand is likely to be that it cooperates more fully with the investigation until its completion. It will then most likely be faced with demands to hand over the individuals named to face trial, either before a Lebanese court or some form of international tribunal. But this will not be straightforward by any means. These individuals are senior figures in a regime that has undergone a number of upheavals of late which already threatened its stability and longevity. Of course there is a strong case to be made that Mehlis’ investigation is only part of a process initiated in Paris and Washington by Security Council Resolution 1559 which is specifically designed to undermine the regime in Damascus. If Mehlis’ findings play a part in speeding up the regime’s demise, Damascus will have only itself to blame. |
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