          | |||||
      
| |||||
|
Features The evolution of Iran's nuclear programme
October 26th, 2005 -- The passage of a resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) on 24 September, paving the way for the possible referral of Iran to the UN Security Council (MEI 759) due to its “many failures and breaches of obligations” under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was the latest twist in the dispute over the nature and aims of Tehran’s nuclear programme. Since 2003, Washington has been urging decisive international action to thwart what it claims are Iran’s attempts to build a nuclear arsenal under the guise of a civilian nuclear programme. In mid-October, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Paris, Moscow and London to garner support for the prompt referral of Tehran to the Security Council. Iran, for its part, has repeatedly denied the allegations against it, arguing that it needs nuclear energy to generate domestic power. The IAEA admits it has not yet found a “smoking gun” but says Iran concealed aspects of its activities for some years, raising doubts about its credibility. In reality, there is some truth in the claims of both the US and Iran. Covert programme Iran had been pursuing a covert nuclear arms programme since the 1980s, but its priorities and aims have changed. Its nuclear programme dates back to the 1950s, when it first received assistance from the US under the Eisenhower Administration’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative. In the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini decreed that all projects and contracts for the construction of nuclear power plants and facilities initiated by the Shah’s regime should be cancelled since he believed Iran did not need nuclear energy. This included halting the construction of two nuclear reactors at Bushehr on the Gulf coast on which the ancien regime had already spent over $3bn. But by the mid-1980s Tehran began to reconsider its position. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran and bombardment of Iranian cities in 1980, his willingness to fire surface-to-surface missiles at urban centres to devastating effect in 1982, his determination to expand the conflict into the Gulf by attacking maritime shipping and his ability to utilize chemical weapons against Iranian troops in 1984, together prompted a radical reassessment. Moreover, while Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981 set back Baghdad’s nuclear programme, it seemed likely Iraq’s programme would resume. Hence, by 1985 Iran was trying to woo back 80% of the 4,500 nuclear scientists and technicians who had left the country after the revolution and to plan the construction of centrifuges for uranium enrichment. In 1986, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, A. Q. Khan, made his first visit to Iran as part of an initiative by Tehran to seek assistance from friendly states to build nuclear facilities. The avail-able evidence indicates that this was, from the start, a gradual, long-term initiative. After Iraq’s defeat in 1991 and the intrusive UN arms inspection regime imposed on Baghdad, doubts persisted about the efficacy of UNSCOM’s efforts. From the Iranian perspective, the survival of the regime constituted a primary threat to its security. And by the 1990s Tehran recognized the importance of a civilian nuclear programme to fulfil long-term domestic energy requirements. A major milestone came in 1995, when Iran signed an $800m agreement with Russia for the construction of the Bushehr reactors that had been abandoned after the revolution. Throughout the 1990s Tehran developed a civilian nuclear programme alongside a covert military one to deter a potential Iraqi threat if UN sanctions were lifted. The current crisis began in 2002. In August that year the Iranian opposition Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO), based in Iraq, revealed that Iran had constructed a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water production plant near Arak without IAEA knowledge. Iran, being one of President Bush’s “axis of evil” states, decided to cooperate and open up its undeclared nuclear installations to IAEA inspection, which commenced in February 2003, just one month before Operation Iraqi Freedom. The swift conquest of Iraq and overthrow of the regime in April 2003 had two significant effects on Iran’s rationale to pursue a covert military nuclear programme. First, the primary threat to Iranian security had been eliminated. Second, in view of the speed with which the US took over Iraq, Tehran was concerned that it might be the next target. For the sake of its own survival Tehran redoubled its efforts to cooperate with the IAEA in order not to furnish Washington, euphoric in victory, with a casus belli. Iran intensified its cooperation with the IAEA, including signing the Additional Protocol for intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities in December 2003. The regime also opened a political dialogue with three European Union states — Britain, France and Germany — who were eager to find a diplomatic solution. “Empty chocolate box” However, Iran committed two major mistakes. First, from the very start it denied it had a covert military programme, which only provided ammunition for its detractors. Second, its dialogue with the EU troika and subsequent agreements reached in October 2003 and November 2004 were of a political, not a legal, nature. Although Iran is entitled under Article IV of the NPT to control the nuclear fuel cycle (including the conversion and enrichment of uranium to produce fuel for civilian nuclear reactors), under the agreements with the EU troika it suspended the fuel cycle activities as a voluntary, legally non-binding, confidence-building measure for 20 months, in exchange for an eventual EU package of economic incentives. Iran’s motives for concluding the two agreements with the EU were three-fold: to strengthen political and economic relations with Europe; to prevent the Bush Administration from rallying the EU behind its campaign to isolate it; and to bolster domestic economic growth and prosperity. In exchange for cooperation on the nuclear issue, the EU troika pledged to support Tehran’s bid to become a member of the World Trade Organization, to sell half a dozen Airbus civilian aircraft and to conclude a bilateral trade and cooperation agreement. But the EU’s package of incentives was not as attractive as portrayed in the media and was to a large extent, dependent on American acquiescence. For example, Washington could at any point during the WTO membership negotiations — which could last for several years — veto Iranian membership. In addition, Tehran later learnt they could not sell it the Airbus planes since the engines it wanted were American-made. Furthermore, the EU was already Iran’s biggest trade partner, so any further trade and economic benefits would have to have been substantial from Tehran’s viewpoint. The last straw for Iran was the European demand that in exchange for economic assistance and technology transfers in the nuclear field, Tehran would have to permanently give up its right to control the nuclear fuel cycle — something which had no legal basis. The Iranians eventually realized that little was on offer. Indeed, as one EU official in Brussels privately admitted, “the package was an empty box of chocolates”. The Bush Administration was also exerting a much influence — direct and indirect — on the process. A key question is whether the basis of the dispute pitting Iran against the US and its allies of a political or legal nature? To date, from a legal standpoint, the evidence indicates that Iran, by concealing certain aspects of its nuclear programme, had violated the spirit of the NPT but not the letter of it. In objective terms, this should still leave room for greater cooperation and confidence-building. However, the US and EU argue that Iran forfeited its rights under the NPT by concealing parts of its nuclear programme. It boils down to a question of political trust. Since the West says it has no faith in Tehran’s intentions, it has concluded that it cannot be trusted and must be cornered, despite important developments and concessions by Iran. In August, a panel of IAEA scientists concluded that traces of highly enriched (weapons-grade) uranium found at two Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2003 came from contaminated equipment imported from Russia and Pakistan, as Tehran had claimed all along. Then in September Western media reports played down or ignored Iran’s proposals for the involvement of foreign state and private companies in its production of nuclear fuel to ensure that none would be diverted for weapons use, and for a greater IAEA presence and monitoring at Iran’s nuclear facilities. Regrettably, the situation has become polarized, and after the IAEA vote on 24 September some circles in the Iranian political leadership have come to advocate severing ties with the IAEA and withdrawing from the NPT. Missed opportunity The US and its allies have been politically motivated in many, if not most, of their actions in this regard. But their emphasis on the nuclear issue has caused a very clear opportunity to be missed to influence the direction of policy in Tehran. After the fall of the regime in Baghdad, Iran’s rulers were at their most vulnerable, making them susceptible to US and EU efforts to press for domestic reforms. Such pressure was more likely to have borne fruit than at any other since the revolution, and might have encouraged major political change in the two years leading up to the 2005 presidential elections. By that time Iranians realized that President Mohammad Khatami’s reform movement had been thwarted by the hard-liners and they were looking for other options to bring about political change. Moreover, the regime was susceptible to internal and external pressure. A combination thereof could have brought about a sea-change in Iranian politics which could, in turn, have resolved the nuclear issue, which at its core revolves around political trust and credibility. However, the Bush Administration remained bent on pursuing its own self-serving agenda. While the majority of Iranians favour political change, despite the election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad in June, they will most likely rally around the government if the nuclear crisis turns to open confrontation. From the people’s perspective, the US and its allies are applying a double standard on the nuclear issue and are indifferent, by and large, to their hopes and aspirations. The West has once more missed a window of opportunity to facilitate political change in Iran and advance its own interests in the Middle East. Jubin M. Goodarzi is an independent Middle East affairs analyst based in Switzerland. |
| ||||
|
WHAT'S NEW? | ABOUT MEI | WHO'S WHO? | SUBSCRIPTIONS GET NEWS BY E-MAIL | FOR WEBMASTERS | LINKS | CONTACT MEI
All content ©1971-2004 Middle East International. Middle East International magazine, 1 Gough Square, London EC4A 3DE, UK. Tel: +44-207-832-1330 | Fax:+44-207-832-1339 | E-mail  | |||||
