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The new Hamas

From Grahm Usher in East Jerusalem

June 23rd, 2005 -- In the last four months the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, has taken four historic decisions. On 12 March it declared that it would participate in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, reversing a decade-old policy of abstention from all Palestinian Authority (PA) institutions born of the Oslo Accords. On 17 March — together with the other Palestinian factions — it vowed to continue “an atmosphere of calm”, tahdiya, for the rest of the year, the so-called Cairo Declaration. It agreed to commence negotiations for joining the Palestine Liberation Organization, the “sole representative” (it now says) for Palestinians inside and outside the homeland. Finally, in April its political leader in Gaza, Mahmud Zahar, announced that were Hamas to be “part [of an elected Palestinian Authority] government, it would participate in negotiations with Israel”, a state his movement officially refuses to recognize.

Taken together, these decisions represent the most important strategic change in Hamas since the movement was founded in 1988. Very simply, Hamas has gone mainstream, moving from a movement of parallel or alternative political authority to the existing PA/PLO political system to one of participation and integration within it.

But what brought about this change? What is its significance? And what does it herald for the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Tempering the resistance

For much of the Intifada Hamas’ unstated goal was to establish “a political, social and military alternative to the existing Palestinian order”, says Ziyad Abu Amr, authority on Palestinian Islamists and a former PA minister. It proved to be a successful policy. In the first three years of the uprising Hamas’ popularity soared by 60%, not only in its heartland of Gaza but in major West Bank centres like Nablus and Hebron.

Hamas owed this rise not only to the armed resistance its fighters put up to Israeli invasions in the Occupied Territories, the collapse of the PA’s security forces, the divisions in Fatah and the visceral appeal of its suicide operations. As important was the movement’s organizational discipline and social agenda: Hamas’ impressive array of charitable and welfare services stood in stark contrast to the inefficiency and nepotism of the PA ministries.

Beyond this, the overall strategy was vague. If there was a domestic policy, it appeared to be to forge a “new national movement” out of the destruction of the old. If there was a means, it appeared to be “the resistance only” path blazed by Hizbullah in Lebanon. If there was a goal, it was not yet a negotiated peace but Israel’s coerced withdrawal or “unilateral separation” from all, most or any part of the Occupied Territories. “The Intifada is about forcing Israel’s withdrawal from the 1967 territories. But that doesn’t mean the Arab-Israeli conflict will be over,” said Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, in October 2002.

Three events tempered the resistance, marking a shift from Hamas trying to create an alternative power centre to the PA and PLO to reaching an accommodation with them. The first was the new regional order born of 11 September, and particularly the US’ “pre-emptive” invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. As one European diplomat with ties to the movement noted: “Hamas, like Syria, feels the chill wind coming from Baghdad and the new licences given to the ‘war on terror.’”

Hamas was particularly concerned that its national-religious struggle against Israel not be tarred with the global jihadist agendas espoused by Usama bin Laden. In June 2003 — two months after the invasion of Iraq — the movement agreed a “unilateral” Palestinian cease-fire with the new PA government of Mahmud Abbas. Unlike the five previous Palestinian cease-fires attempted during the Intifada, this one had the backing not only of the Hamas leadership in Gaza but also of the “outside” leadership based in Damascus, as well as the crucial constituency of Hamas prisoners in Israeli jails.

Nor did any part of the united leadership abandon the truce, despite an Israeli arrest sweep that netted 300 Hamas activists and an assassination policy that killed three of its military leaders in Nablus. The truce was effectively ended by the suicide bombing of a bus in West Jerusalem that left 23 Israelis dead, but executed by a rogue Hamas cell from Hebron (an operation the leadership was ready to simultaneously claim and denounce). It was renounced officially after Israel’s retaliatory assassination of Hamas’ political leader in Gaza, Ismail Abu Shanab, the main advocate of truce and accommodation in the movement.

The second was the unprecedented military offensive Israel launched against the movement, especially the assassinations of its political and military leadership. In the seven months following the collapse of the truce, Israeli death squads killed not only Abu Shanab, but military commander Ibrahim Maqadima, the movement’s founder, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, and Gaza leader Rantisi. It tried to kill Muhammad Dif, the head of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, as well as the new political leader in Gaza, Zahar, and it also gave clear notice that Hamas’ overall leader, Khaled Mish’al, was in its sights. Israel — and the new network of collaborators it recruited through its reconquest of the PA areas — was also extremely effective at wiping out large parts of Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank.

These assaults were coupled with diplomatic and financial sanctions. In August 2003, the PA froze Islamic charity bank accounts in Gaza, as did the US and Britain in their domains. According to an Egyptian diplomat, with the exception of Iran, Hamas’ funding from the regional states has all but dried up, forcing the movement to depend ever more heavily on local revenue (a means not to be underestimated: on 9 April 2004 a Hamas fundraiser in Gaza generated $3m in one day, according to Hamas sources). And in October 2003 the European Union placed the movement as a whole (as opposed to only its military wing) on its terrorist list. It was a designation that marked a defeat for Hamas’ diplomatic struggle to be recognized as an authentic national liberation movement.

The third event was Ariel Sharon’s announcement — theoretically in December 2003, actually in February 2004 — that, in the absence of a “partner” and a peace process, Israel would withdraw unilaterally from most of Gaza and four settlements in the northern West Bank. Hamas immediately claimed the “retreat” as a victory for its strategy of armed resistance. More astutely, it recognized that “disengagement” offered an exit from an armed struggle that had not only inflicted overpowering Israeli punishment on the Palestinians but was wrecking Hamas’ own claims to power. It understood that now was the moment to translate the kudos it had earned among Palestinians from the armed uprising and its social services into political and institutional power.

Yasin revealed the new line in a series of meetings held with the PA and Palestinian factions prior to his assassination by Israeli helicopter gunships in March 2004. It had three planks, says Abu Amr, the PA’s point-man in the dialogue with Hamas.

Translating the gains

The first was an agreement that for the duration of the Gaza withdrawal (on condition that it would be complete, including from the border with Egypt) Hamas would bow to the PA demand to hold fire. It was a position shared by all the factions, including Islamic Jihad and Fatah’s Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
The second was that, until the withdrawal, Hamas would “escalate” the armed resistance in Gaza while curtailing suicide operations inside Israel. This essentially is what happened prior to the cease-fire declared in March in Cairo and what happens today whenever Hamas deems Israel in violation of the truce or the PA in breach of the understandings reached in Cairo. Usually in concert with other militia, Hamas guerrillas launch spectacular attacks on Israeli military outposts and settlements in Gaza while raining mortars on Israeli border towns so that their residents glimpse what Palestinians in Gaza have experienced for the last five years.

The point of the military spikes is political, says Abu Amr. It reinforces the Palestinian and regional perception that Israel is leaving Gaza under duress rather than choice. It demonstrates — despite the political and military loss of its leaders — that Hamas remains a formidable military power that no domestic or foreign force can quell. Finally, it strengthens Hamas’ hand in the national dialogue. A measure of that strength was given on 11 June when the PA’s foreign minister, Nasser al-Qidwa, gave voice to a pledge Hamas has wanted to hear. “The dismantling of the armed groups is not on the table as long as the occupation exists. Possession of arms is a strategic need as long as there is occupation,” he said.

The third plank was to reach a “national accord” with the PA and other factions on power-sharing in a post-disengagement Palestinian administration. Following three years of dialogue, an agreement in principle on three points was finally reached in Cairo:

1) a “formula for decision-making” between the PA and factions pending the Legislative Council elections, both in relation to the cease-fire and the distribution of settlement assets left by Israel in Gaza;

2) establishment of a cross-factional committee to reactivate and redefine the PLO institutions, enabling Hamas’ participation in them;

3) a commitment by Hamas to participate in the Legislative Council elections, and on the basis of their elected representation there, to become an integral but also accountable part of the Palestinian political system, including membership within the PLO’s National Council and executive committees.

Taken together, the Cairo Declaration represents the greatest organizational harmony ever between the PLO/PA and Hamas. Seventeen years after its founding, 12 years after Oslo and five years into the Second Intifada, the new Hamas has been born.

Hegemony

It has already borne fruit. In the Palestinian local elections held in December, January and May, Hamas lists won 60% of all seats, with majorities in 30% of all municipalities, including towns like Qalqiliya (it also won what have now become challenged victories in Rafah, Burayj and Beit Lahiya in Gaza). Given its strong urban base, few Palestinians doubt these gains will be repeated once the third round of local elections are held, which includes Gaza City, Nablus, Hebron and Jenin. Needless to say, these and future electoral victories has raised challenged the US and EU policy of blacklisting the movement.

It was also in response to these gains that Fatah, backed by Egypt, the US, EU and Israel, postponed the Legislative Council elections, scheduled originally for July. Hamas’ response to this violation of the Cairo Declaration has been surprisingly muted, urging only that the existing electoral law be changed and that a new date for the poll be set before the end of the year. There are two reasons for this, say sources.

The first is the conviction among Hamas that while elections can be delayed, they cannot be denied, given the support they command in Palestinian opinion and across all the factions, except for the Fatah leadership. Very simply, any attempt to permanently exclude Hamas from the spoils of political power will be met by Hamas’ refusal to be included in any long-time cease-fire, the cornerstone of Abbas’ political strategy. This leverage has been strengthened by the PA’s vow not to forcibly disarm the Palestinian militias, even after the elections.

Nor, actually, is Hamas seeking governmental power or office; it is seeking political hegemony. The most it aspires to in the elections is a representation commensurate to its current strength on the ground. According to a recent poll by the Palestinian Survey and Research Centre, this would a mean a legislature in which Fatah has 44% of the seats and Hamas 33%, with the balance held by independents, the left-wing factions and independent Fatah members. It would make Hamas the largest force in a majority bloc, able, where necessary, to vote down Fatah.

Would this mean the abrogation of all agreements signed with Israel and an untrammelled return to armed struggle? No, says Palestinian analyst Khaled Hroub, an authority on Hamas. As Zahar’s comment on negotiations with Israel implied, it would more likely speed Hamas’ already clear drift towards accepting a final agreement “that would satisfy Palestinian rights according to the parameters of the Madrid Conference and UN resolutions,” says Hroub.

But it would harden a Palestinian resolve against any deal that fell short of that, including the Israeli-US “interim” proposal for a Palestinian state “with provisional borders” and/or a Geneva Accord-like arrangement which recognizes Israel’s annexation of the settlement blocs and redirects the refugees’ right of return to a Palestinian state rather than to “their homes and property” in what was Mandate Palestine but is now Israel.

This, says Hamas political leader Ismail Haniya, is in any case the real national consensus. But it needs to be grounded on democracy, governance, international law and “satisfying the needs of the people rather than the needs of the organization”. If he is now turning to the ballot box as well as the gun, it is because Hamas is confident that it, rather than Fatah, is best placed to protect the consensus, but “based on a national coalition government and away from one-party rule”.



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