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MEIonline.com
News Analysis
The Cedar Revolution
From Jim Quilty in Beirut
March 2nd, 2005 --
Prime Minister Umar Karami resigned on 28 February, and took his cabinet with him. He made the announcement two weeks after the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri in the midst of a parliamentary session wending its way to a vote of no confidence in his government. No one looked more unpleasantly surprised than House Speaker Nabih Berri, who complained that he ought to have been informed of Karami’s plans.
The announcement brought cheers of victory from the thousands of youthful Lebanese who had began gathering at Martyr’s Square the night before — in defiance of the ban on public gatherings announced by Interior Minister Sulayman Franjieh.
It was easy to see this as their victory. For the previous two weeks demonstrators had been writing on white banners, demanding the government’s resignation and Syrian withdrawal. Eliyas Atallah, secretary of the Democratic Left Movement, had called on the youths to occupy Sahat al-Shuhada the previous day; he now urged the occupation to continue until the Syrian army left the country.
With the multi-partisan crowds largely complying with orders to abjure their party banners — Lebanese Forces, Free Patriotic Movement, Progressive Socialist Party — in favour of the Lebanese flag, and with many adorned with the same red and white “revolutionary cockade” being worn scarf-like by opposition deputies these last weeks, the emulation of recent events in Kiev was obvious.
Also evocative of the Ukrainian precedent were the carnival-like atmosphere around Martyr’s Square for the last two weeks, the cordial relations between the crowds and the ubiquitous security services, and the popular euphoria ignited by this unusual demonstration of Lebanese solidarity — and its apparent (virtually unprecedented) impact on the government.
The United States State Department obliged by dubbing Karami’s resignation a “Cedar Revolution”, filing it alongside Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution, Georgia’s Rose Revolution and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.
As was the case in Kiev, though, this day inspired some scepticism. Equally significant is the uncertainty as to what exactly the state and the opposition will do next.
The funeral
The days between Hariri’s assassination and funeral were a time of unusual quiet on Beirut’s streets. The state called for three days of mourning for the occasion; the opposition called it a three-day general strike. The murder of such a high-profile figure naturally evoked bad memories of the country’s civil war. Little comfort was found in the confidence that social and political forces (local and international) are arrayed differently than they were in 1975.
The day of Hariri’s funeral (16 February) turned into a popular outpouring of grief and rage the like of which is rarely seen here. The estimated turn-out was at least 150,000. Excluding Nabih Berri, the state respected the Hariri family’s wishes and stayed away. Druze and Sunnis were most visible but official and informal representatives from all the country’s confessions were in attendance.
Among the dignitaries attending was US Assistant Secretary of State William Burns, who demanded a thorough investigation into the killing. Hariri’s close friend, French President Jacques Chirac, made a seven-hour visit with his wife to offer his condolences and visit the tomb. He used the occasion to lionize Hariri and to call for an international investigation. He saw no Lebanese officials.
Hariri’s supporters swore allegiance to Baha al-Din, eldest of the slain billionaire’s five sons, but so far none of the brothers, all political neophytes, have officially taken on the mantle.
Pundits depicted the funeral as an event that lowered the barriers between the various sectarian communities. The weeks of demonstrations that followed underlined how logistics facilitated such multi-confessional mobilization.
Hariri’s corpse was interred near the still unfinished Muhammad al-Amin Mosque — the massive, four-minaret structure that the former prime minister helped bankroll. The mosque happens to be adjacent to Martyr’s Square, an area that (even during the martyrs statue’s long absence) has acted like a lightning rod for youth protest.
In the weeks following the funeral, the demonstrators have been a motley crew of Druze PSP, Christian supporters of Michel Aoun, Lebanese Forces, opposition Phalangists, Chamounists, Sunni Hariri supporters, democratic leftists of various confessions, and otherwise unaffiliated Lebanese responding to the outrage of the assassination and the necessity that something be done. Shi’ites were included in these groups, but the leadership of Hizbullah and Harakat Amal have been absent.
Banners bearing the slogan “Syria out” were ubiquitous and there has been no shortage of off-colour language shouted (and written) against the present Lebanese and Syrian regimes.
Opposition
Hariri’s funeral transformed naturally into anti-regime protest, and not only in Beirut. The next day thousands of protesters were reported on the streets in the overwhelmingly Sunni city of Tripoli, Prime Minister Karami’s home town. Hundreds demonstrated in Hariri’s home town of Sidon in the south. Reports emerged of assaults against Syrian workers there and of the lodgings and vehicles of Syrians being set on fire.
Days after the funeral demonstrators hung a huge banner bearing the words “Resign” in French and Arabic near Hariri’s grave. For many Lebanese, none less perhaps than Karami himself, the scene was reminiscent of the 1992 protests that drove him from office and paved the way for Hariri’s first term.
The opposition’s first effort to make the demonstrations their own came on 18 February, when 40 deputies called for an “uprising for independence”. The same day, Karami’s minister for tourism, Farid al-Khazen (a Maronite Christian), resigned. He said the government was unable to “remedy the dangerous situation in the country”.
The next night more than 2,000 people demonstrated outside parliament, calling for Syrian troops to leave and Karami to step down and vowing to continue their protests until Hariri’s killers were found.
Earlier in the day, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfayr had appealed for “calm and reason”. Sfayr told the press that he still supported implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops but that nobody wants to force Syria to withdraw its troops.
One week after the assassination, on 21 February, tens of thousands of demonstrators converged on the site where Hariri and 16 others were killed to observe a minute’s silence at 12.55 pm, the time of the deadly explosion. Carrying Lebanese flags and images of other assassinated leaders, wearing red and white scarves, they marched to Martyr’s Square chanting “Syria out” and “Freedom, sovereignty, independence”, and demanding that Karami step down. Neither Internal Security nor the army interfered.
Over these two weeks the 2km area between Sadat al-Shuhada and the site of the bomb became the scene of a sort of performance activism. Set up near the site itself, a group called “Citizens4Lebanon” has collected 18,000 signatures on a petition demanding to know the truth behind Hariri’s murder. On 26 February a “human chain” protest saw people hold hands in a line stretching from the tomb to the bomb site.
Exiled former army commander Michel Aoun told the press on 21 February that he would return to Lebanon in time to contest elections in the spring. Asked if he would consider running for the Lebanese presidency, he said he would assume his responsibilities according to the will of the Lebanese people.
Martyr’s Square had become a campsite by 22 February, with youth wings of various opposition parties holding a round-the-clock sit-in. The area was adorned with banners calling for the government’s resignation, condemning Syria, or simply saying “We Want the Truth”. Visitors and demonstrators have used these banners as media to express their frustration and outrage with the current situation.
The next day the opposition demanded that parliament suspend debate on the 2005 electoral law, saying it was shameful to carry on with business as usual until the authorities had found Hariri’s killers. They also called a one-day general strike for 28 February, two weeks after the assassination, the same day deputies would vote on the no-confidence motion in parliament.
In a rare show of activism, Lebanese business leaders announced a lock-out for the same day, to add their voices to the demand that Karami’s government step down. The statement, signed by Lebanon’s association of bankers and industrialists, as well as the chambers of commerce and industry, called for a “total closure in memory of Rafiq al-Hariri”.
Observers did not take the no-confidence vote very seriously, since the government had a sound majority in the 128-member parliament. For his part, Karami said he was ready to resign, as long as a new government could be agreed on to replace the present one.
Hegemony
Shortly after Hariri’s murder his family called on the international community to launch an investigation. “We will not spare any effort or means to find the perpetrators of this crime,” said their statement, “no matter what their affiliation.”
The state at first opposed any foreign-led investigation into the bombing, though it did ask Swiss forensic and explosives experts to assist in its own. The US and French governments and the EU, in the meantime, have constantly reminded the Lebanese that the progress of its investigation is being monitored.
On 21 February European Union foreign ministers said they would “remain vigilant” to ensure Lebanese legislative elections were actually held in May “without any foreign interference or influence”. They also said an “international inquiry should be undertaken without delay to shed light on the circumstances and those responsible for this attack” on Hariri.
The same day President Bush said in Belgium that, among other things, “the Syrian regime must end its occupation of Lebanon”. The next day Bush and Chirac called for the immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops. Chirac said that the withdrawal of the Syrian military alone was insufficient, that the Syrian intelligence services had to disengage as well.
Syria let it be known on 21 February that it planned to redeploy to Lebanon’s eastern borders, in accordance with the Taif Accords. Though Israel welcomed the Syrian announcement, the State Department announced on 26 February that withdrawal to the Syrian border was insufficient, since 1559 “calls in clear, unequivocal terms for all foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon”.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield, a former US ambassador to Beirut, arrived in the country on 27 February to press Lebanon on Syrian withdrawal and a thorough inquiry into Hariri’s assassination. He met Sfayr and told the press that the US wanted 1559 implemented as soon as possible. The international community, he said, is “calling for an end to foreign interference in Lebanese affairs. It is not... interference for the world to talk of the need for Lebanese to live in freedom.”
Karami steps aside
Not all Lebanese reactions to the “Cedar Revolution” have been joyous. While celebrations were taking place in Beirut, angry Karami supporters in Tripoli fired Kalashnikovs into the air and burned and looted the offices of opposition politicians. One 22-year-old Karami supporter was shot dead in the proceedings.
Overseas, the responses have been more positive. After her staff named Karami’s resignation a revolution, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked that the events “are moving in a very important direction. The Lebanese people are starting to express their aspirations for democracy. This is something that we support very much.”
Israeli newspapers also applauded Karami’s resignation as a victory for democracy. One decided that this was the first time a popular opposition movement had successfully toppled the Lebanese government and speculated that events in Beirut could presage profound democratic change in the region.
The immediate consequence of Karami’s resignation is to make President Emile Lahoud a good deal more uncomfortable. Like the prime ministers who served before him, Karami served as something of a sandbag, taking the full brunt of foreign and domestic criticism for positions of the president’s devising. Quite circumspect since Hariri’s death — in late February he had a colourful photo-op with a trio of anti-Zionist Orthodox Jews at Ba’abda Palace — Lahoud will briefly bear the full weight of international pressure, i.e. 1559.
The question that immediately arises is who will lead the lame-duck government that must oversee the spring elections. Lahoud has given deputies 48 hours to decide on a Sunni Muslim candidate for the post. It is said they will lean towards an elder statesman, thereby disqualifying Hariri’s sister Bahiya, who spoke so passionately at parliament’s last session. The obvious choice, Salim al-Hoss, the former prime minister, has already disqualified himself, being in ill health. It may well be Tammam Salam, the veteran Beirut politician who lost his seat to Hariri’s slate in the 2000 elections.
Once formed, the government will have to decide what to do about the spring elections — whether to go with the election law proposed by Sulayman Franjieh or to find another model. Since so many voices (domestic and foreign) are pushing to have elections go ahead, it seems likely they will go ahead regardless. Since Washington and Paris regard Syrian withdrawal to be a precondition for free and fair elections, the next few months here could be very interesting.
Given the euphoria that has greeted Karami’s exit, it seems callous to regard the last two weeks’ developments from a sceptical remove. Indeed, scepticism should be administered cautiously. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the events of the last two weeks — not to “the opposition”, but to the activist habit of mind that is essential to the success of a participatory democracy (and has been so often crushed and manipulated in this country), that thing called “civil society”.
The challenge confronting Lebanese in the weeks ahead is much more difficult than that of the last weeks: to maintain a voice in the political process once it stops being entertaining carnival and becomes inconvenient or dangerous, as it can be when so many politicians have a history of militia or gangster activity.
The more difficult question is whether this great victory was really the work of Lebanon’s long-quiescent civil society, or whether the lines of force radiated from outside — the unprecedented international pressure that has come to bear on an ineffectual administration in disarray.
It may have been the former; the memories of 1992 may have had some impact on Karami’s thinking. Yet there is a nagging suspicion that it was otherwise.
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